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I.

SUMMARY OF REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

The City's brief makes the conclusory statement that nothing has changed since

Haik I and Haik II (City Br. I 0), failing to acknowledge that the City's newly filed
lawsuit demonstrates the incongruity between its position, on one hand, that it can hold
water rights with expressed intent not to use them while, on the other hand, employing
those same water rights as the basis for preventing use by others. The City's alleged
standing in this case is premised wholly and specifically upon the allegation that the
Haik's private water right, Haik v. Sandy City. 2011 UT 26 ("We therefore affirm the
district court's entry of summary judgment quieting title to the water right in favor of the
Haik Parties."), injures and interferes with the City's water rights. The City argues that
"The Haik v. Sandy City decision does not affect the validity of the conveyance from the
Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney to Sandy City. (R2011, 169)
This new and independent claim by the City of injury and interference not only
defies the doctrine of stare decisis, See State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477,481 (Utah 2003);
State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995), but it also presents a new and
dispositive fact wholly changing the landscape that proved the basis of Haik I and Haik
II. Haik is not claiming the right to acquire the City's rights under appropriative law but

rather seeking the Court declare whether the City's rights can be a basis for alleged injury
or interference given the City's premise.
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By alleging injury and interference, the City put at issue specific questions raised
in the counterclaims regarding the City's water rights and their use: there cannot be injury
to or interference with the City's rights and use if the City is obliged to serve the very use
which the City alleges causes the injury and interference.
In addition to failing to substantively address this new fact, the City did not
present a statement of facts relevant to the issues. (City Br.) The City did not challenge
any of Haik's stated facts relevant to the issues presented for review. (City Br.) The City
failed to conform to the requirements of U. R. App. 24(a). By ignoring U. R. App. 24(a),
the City did not address the effect of its pleading in this case. The City's Complaint
newly and independently put at issue the City's water rights and use; and, thereby
properly gave rise to the declaratory relief pied in the counterclaims.
The City also failed to apply the proper standard of review in its analysis: "factual
allegations are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts
are considered in a light most favorable to" Haik. Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 332
P.3d 922, 932 n. l (Utah 2014). Accordingly, claims will survive dismissal "so long as
their allegations, taken as true, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, satisfy
the requirements of our standing test". Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of the Dep't of
Natural Res. of Utah, 228 P.3d 747, 752 (Utah 2010). "Under a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal,
our inquiry is concerned solely with 'the sufficiency of the pleadings, [and] not the
underlying merits of [the] case.' Oakwood Viii. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d
1226, 1230 (Utah 2004 ).
2
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The byproduct of the City's failing to abide by the governing standard of review is
that the City ignores the facts which changed circumstances and show the lack of identity
and absence of finality.

It is these new facts that render claim or issue preclusion

inapplicable and underscore the real need for constitutional interpretation by this Court.
II.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

a. City's Suit for Injury and Interference Changed Circumstances
As Haik recited in its opening brief, the City alleged "The water rights claims of
Defendants currently and materially injure Plaintiffs by placing a cloud of record on
SLC's title to LCC water rights." (R2002, ~24) (Br. Haik pp. 15) And "The City sued
Haik alleging his claim to water "will interfere with the Plaintiffs' respective rights to
divert, treat and provide LCC water to the members of the public served by Plaintiffs".
(R2017, ~119) (Br. Haik p. 33) Haik then explained "the State law counterclaims are
pied solely for declaratory relief in response to claim of injury and suit by the City". (Br.
Haik p. 41)
The City did not sue Haik until more than 16 years after decision by Judge Jenkins
in Haik v. Town of Alta, et al (R3207-R3236); 15 years after decision by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Haik v. Town of Alta, et al (R3238-R3243); and more than I
year after decision by Judge Stewart in Haik v. Salt Lake City Corporation, et al (R3 l 96R3205). (R000 1-R00 11) The City sued Haik before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued decision in Haik v. Salt Lake City Corporation, et al. (R3 I 84-R3 l 94) The City
sued Haik before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Stewart's dismissal
3
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on grounds of preclusion based upon the same cases asserted in this matter in Haik v. Salt
Lake County Bd. Of Health. (Br. Haik, pp. 39-40)
These Federal courts could never have adjudicated the City's present allegation
that "The water rights claims of Defendants currently and materially injure Plaintiffs by
placing a cloud of record on SLC 's title to LCC water rights." (R2002, if24) These
Federal courts could never have adjudicated the City's allegation in this action that
Haik's claim to private water "will interfere with the Plaintiffs' respective rights to divert,
treat and provide LCC water to the members of the public served by Plaintiffs". (R2017,
1119)
In Haik v. Town of Alta, the Federal District Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals; could never have adjudicated the City's water rights because the City admits it
"did not list SLC's many approved change applications". (Br. Haik, p. 24) The City
admits: "Judge Jenkins did not directly address the claim that Art. XI, § 6, of the Utah
Constitution requires the City to provide water". (Br. Haik, p. 15) Similarly, in Haik v.
Town of Alta, the Federal courts could never have adjudicated whether Haik's water right
injures the City because this Court did not quiet title until May 10, 201 1, Haik v. Sandy
City, 2011 UT 26.
Further, in Haik v. Town of Alta, the Federal courts could never have adjudicated
whether the City's letter of May 23, 2011 implements an unlawful policy or custom of
Salt Lake City Corporation of denying water service in Albion Basin, including to the
Haiks, as evidenced by the memoranda of the Director of Public Utilities; nor whether as
4
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a direct result of the May 2011 letter, the Salt Lake Valley Health Department and the
Town of Alta denied approvals sought by Mark Haik to allow construction of single
family homes in Albion Basin Subdivision. (R3082 iJiJ76-77) The City sent its letter
more than 12 years after those Federal decisions. (R3080 iJ70)
Haik v. Salt Lake City Corporation, et al, commenced on October 25, 2012.
(R3 l 99) The complaint alleged nothing about the water right quieted in favor of Haik by
this Court in Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26. (R3068-R3182) The City moved to
dismiss and never alleged in answer or counterclaim that Haik's water right claim
"currently and materially injure Plaintiffs by placing a cloud of record on SLC's title to
LCC water rights" or that Haik's water right claim "will interfere with the Plaintiffs'
respective rights to divert, treat and provide LCC water to the members of the public
served by Plaintiffs". (R3 l 96-R3205)

b. "Nothing New" Arguments Erroneously Ignore City's Pleadings
The City's argument "[t]here is nothing new" is error. (City Br. p. 25) Under the
proper standard of review, this Court must assume the truth of the pleadings favorable to
Haik. Applying that standard, it is indisputable the 'transaction" changed when the City
sued for injury and interference with its rights arising from a right quieted only in May
2011.

The City cannot point to any prior case in which its allegations of injury or

interference exist or were adjudicated.
What is particularly compelling about this point are two aspects. First, the City
~-withheld~· from Judge Jenkins its approved water rights. To then argue the existence of

5
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the -~withheld" water rights was a fact barring subsequent adjudication lacks merit.
Second, the fact at issue is allegation of injury or interference caused by Haik's private
water right recognized more than twelve years later. Plainly, Haik could not have raised
either point in the prior action.
Haik' s counterclaims do not stem from a decades long-effort but rather a lawsuit
brought by the City against him. In that lawsuit, the City alleges injury and interference
caused by Haik's private water right claim affirmed in May 2011. Never before had
Haik's private water right been adjudicated. The City's lawsuit is indisputably a "new
and independent" claim opening the door to this Court applying Article XI, § 6, and the
related questions concerning how the City's conducts the public's water business.
The City's argument "[h]ere, there are no 'new facts"' is likewise wrong. (City
Br. p. 27) That argument essentially contends Haik should have sued the City asking a
Court declare whether Haik's private water right could injure City water rights

anticipatingfuture allegation by the City that:
68.
The Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney, Inc. sold any water
rights they had relating to lands under the South Despain Ditch to Sandy
City in 1977. Any adjudication in which it was concluded otherwise is not
binding upon Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs were not parties to that proceeding.
69.
The Haik v. Sandy City decision does not affect the validity
of the conveyance from the Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney to Sandy
City.
70.
One requirement for water rights to pass as an appurtenance
is unity of title. Ownership of the water rights in question and the land in
question must be the same. After the conveyance to Sandy City, no
conveyance of land by Saunders and Sweeney or the Bentleys could carry
by appurtenance any part of the South Despain first primary award.
6
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(R2011, 1168-70)(Br. Haik, pp. 50-51) The City never presented its allegations Haik's

private water right caused injury or interference in any earlier suit. The City's allegation
that this Court's adjudication "does not affect the validity of the conveyance from the
Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney to Sandy City" is not "one that could and should
have been raised in the first action". Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F.3d 1142,
1146 (I 0th Cir. 2006) citing Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93.
Haik is not engaged in claim-splitting but rather defending himself because the
City rejects this Court's decision and alleges claim of injury or interference never
previously raised. Haik could not raise allegations not yet made by the City. Essentially,
the City contends the prior adjudication stripped Haik of any defense to the City's never

before raised claim of injury and interference. The City's contention does not fall within
any exception to the new and independent claim rule.
The City argues adjudication (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) that Haik lacks a federal
constitutional right strips him of right to declaration of how State constitutional
guarantees apply to new claims of injury lacks merit. Haik simply could not raise his
defenses to City claims of injury never previously made. None of the prior Courts could
adjudicate injury and interference never alleged by the City. Haik did not fail to assert
his counterclaims as the question only arose because the City sued. Here the Federal
courts did not even exercise any supplemental jurisdiction.

Other than erroneously

interpreting Article XI, § 6, the City cannot point to any adjudication of any state issue.

7
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c. Primacy Approach and Jensen Mandate Constitutional Analysis

The City's arguments as to Jensen misapprehend the core point of that decision.
This Court recognizes "the primacy approach, which dictates an analysis of state
constitutional law before addressing any federal constitutional claims."
Cunningham, 2011 UT 17,

~

Jensen v.

46. The District Court departed from primacy and erred due

to the differing constitutional standards: "Because the state and federal standards for
determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to damages for a constitutional violation are
different, a federal court determination that the material undisputed facts do not give rise
to a federal constitutional violation does not preclude a state court from deciding whether
those same facts will give rise to a state constitutional violation." Jensen v. Cunningham,
201 1 UT 17, ~ 49.
How the State constitutional standards now apply in the context of the City's
claim of injury and interference allegedly caused by Haik's private water right need to be
adjudicated. It is precisely because the trial court failed to undertake State constitutional
analysis that this Court must reverse and remand, with guiding constitutional principles
for applying Article XI, § 6, and other constitutional provisions, appropriation statutes,
and prior appropriation precedence.
The City's jurisdictional arguments misapprehend the point.

What is new and

independent in this action is that the City rejects decision of the court of last resort
quieting title in favor of Haik. The City's alleged injury and interference is premised
wholly and specifically upon Haik's private water right. It is the Citis premise that
8
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takes this case out of claim and issue preclusion. The City's argument of injury and
interference are founded upon a void deed.
Unlike claim and issue preclusion, a more fundamental doctrine is stare decisis.
The novel aspect of the City's alleged injury and interference is its rejection of a point of
law to which the lower Courts are bound. It is the City's argument that a void deed gave
rise to injury to and interference with the City's water rights that erodes the foundation of
judicial integrity and the rule of law, and fosters needless litigation.

It is the City's premise which most clearly shows the difference in issues, the lack
of finality, and the need for this Court's guidance in interpreting the Utah constitution.
Having asserted jurisdiction, the trial court cannot then split the City's claims between
those made before and after the City alleges injury and interference. Having made a new
and independent claim of injury and interference, the City brought with it the proper
meaning and application of the Utah Constitution, statutes, and prior precedence.
As to any jurisdictional implications of the City's premise; this Court, and other
courts, always have jurisdiction to consider their jurisdiction. W. Water, LLC v. Olds,
2008 UT I 8,

if 42, citing Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 926 (7th

Cir. 2000).
And, contrary to the City's argument, the five issues raised in the counterclaims

are not "identical to those raised in either or both Haik I and Haik If'. (City Br. p. I3)
Brief comparison is appropriate.

9
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d. City Put at Issue Constitutional Basis for Its Water Rights and Use

As to the first counterclaim, the City asserts Haik seeks declaration as to his
"entitlement to water supply as authorized by Water Rights 57-10013 (al6844) or 5710015 (al6846) to serve homes in Albion Basin Subdivision." (City Br. p. 14) The City
omits the actual request: "Counterclaim Plaintiffs seek declaration determining their
rights, status, and other legal relations as to the City arising from or relating to Article XI,

§ 6; and their ownership of lots within Albion Basin Subdivision including their
entitlement to water supply as authorized by Water Rights 57-10013 (a16844) or 5710015 (a16846) to serve homes in Albion Basin Subdivision and the status of the 1963
agreement asserted by the City and used as a basis for denial of approval by the Salt Lake
County Board of Health." (R2779, ,I122)
Haik is squarely entitled to declaration because, after the prior Federal decisions;
the City put at issue its "LCC water rights" and its "rights to divert, treat and provide
LCC water to the members of the public served by Plaintiffs" at issue. (R2002, iJ24;
R2017 ,II 19)

"[I]nasmuch as its authority and responsibility to furnish water to its

residents derives from our Constitution," the City squarely placed at issue the
constitutional provision from which it derives water rights and upon which the City
premises injury. Salt Lake Cty. v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977).
Haik falls squarely within a "member of the public" inasmuch as his property is
part of the City's approved municipal service area of Water Rights 57-10013 (al6844) or
57-10015 (a 16846). Given the City is now suing members of the public whose property
10
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can be served by approved water right but who are denied water by the City; "it would
seem advisable that there be either some clearer understanding or some contractual
arrangement defining mutual rights and obligations". Id. Whatever the prior Federal
court interpretations, this Court holds "authority and obligation to interpret Utah's
constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we owe federal law no
more deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical state
language." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49; Gray v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 681 P.2d 807
(Utah 1984 ).
By alleging injury and interference by Haik, the City put at issue its water rights
and their use: there cannot be injury to or interference with the City's rights and use if the
City is obliged to serve the very use which the City alleges causes the injury and
interference.
e. Article I, § 24, Never Adjudicated by Federal Courts
As to the second counterclaim the City similarly obfuscates asserting "whether
SLCs refusal to supply water to his Albion Basin lots violates his right to equal
protection" was "decided in Haik I, and in Haik II in the specific context of the post-Haik
I facts Mr. Haik again relies on". (City Br. p. 16) In Haik I, the first three counts only

allege claims against the Town of Alta, not the City. (R3056-R3059) Nothing in those
counts pertains to Haik's water right or the City's allegation of injury or interference;
rather each centered on Alta's acts and the Town's annexation of Albion Basin
Subdivision. (R3056-R3059)
11
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In Haik I, the last two counts sought declaratory and injunctive relief, respectively.
(R3060-R3 06 I)

The Fourth Count centered upon whether Alta's Water Supply

Agreement barred extension of water and entitlement to receive water from Alta.
(R3060) The Fifth Count centered upon preventing Salt Lake City and Alta from raising
the Water Supply Agreement as a defense to the extension by Alta of its water lines to the
Haik's property; and requiring Alta to make available to the Haik's Albion Basin property
the municipal services necessary to receive a building permit". (R306 I)
This focus upon the Water Supply Agreement is clear as Judge Jenkins wrote:
As noted above, however, Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish water
to users outside its own city limits, be they 'similarly situated' or not. As
an owner of water rights, Salt Lake City's role in this instance is proprietary
rather than administrative. The equal protection yardstick is simply not
available to measure Salt Lake City's exercise of its contractual powers to
consent pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Water Supply Agreement.
(RI 809-10) The City admits it "did not list SLC's many approved change applications".
(Br. Haik, p. 24) The City further admits: "Judge Jenkins did not directly address the
claim that Art. XI, § 6, of the Utah Constitution requires the City to provide water".
(App. Case 13-4050 Doc OIO I 9097685, p. 26)
The City's assertion obfuscates by implicitly extending this ruling from Alta's
"Water Supply Agreement" to "SLC's many approved change applications" never
disclosed. The City's omissions obfuscate by arguing to extend the ruling from limited
"proprietary" ruling to a broad "administrative" ruling.
It is precisely the City's omission of the "'administrative" which moved the City's

duty into "a ministerial act about which it would have no discretion" as opined in Rose v.
12
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Plymouth Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285, 286 (Utah 1946).

(R2769-70, ,r8 I).

Moreover, by keeping "SLC's many approved change applications'· from the Federal
court, the City kept from the Federal courts that the City line had already been "drawn

differently". (City Br. p. 17)

It is the City's loss of "discretion" which the City

obfuscates by failing to carefully articulate the record.
Judge Jenkins appeared to recognize Article XI, § 6, bore directly upon duty to
supply: "The general duty imposed upon municipalities by Article XI, § 6 of the Utah
Constitution, viz., that "all such waterworks, water rights, and sources of water supply
now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved,
maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable
charges," presupposes that the water to be supplied to inhabitants has already been

lawfully acquired by the municipality." (R3223 n. 13)(Emphasis added). The City
withheld from Judge Jenkins the City's already lawfully acquired water to serve the
homes at issue. (R2758 ,r,rI0-12; R2760 ,r,r22-24; R2764 ,r50; R2768 ,r73)
In Haik II, new facts were presented sufficient to assert Federal equal protection
claims.

(R3190) In Haik II, the Complaint first alleged Salt Lake City Corporation

violated the guarantee of equal protection afforded to the Haik by Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(R3163-3 l 64 if~521-528)

That Complaint then alleged Jeffery Niermeyer, the Director of Public Utilities, in a
personal capacity violated equal protection guaranteed to Haik by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. (R3164-3 l 69, ~if530-557) Relief as to
13
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equal protection was only sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the
Federal constitution. 1 (R3 l 8 l)
Unlike the Haik II complaint, the second counterclaim seeks declaration of
uniform treatment under the Utah Constitution: "Counterclaim Plaintiffs seek declaration
determining their rights, status, and other legal relations as to the City arising from or
relating to Article I, § 24; and whether they are entitled to be treated uniformly with other
inhabitants of the City's municipal service area defined, among other ways, as "those
areas that have been included by approved change application" whether the property is
within or without municipal corporate boundaries." (R27791124) The counterclaim sets
out specific facts evidencing lack of uniformity and differential treatment.

(R2764-

R27691149-77)
Nothing in the Tenth Circuit's opinion suggests that Court in any manner
interpreted or applied Article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution or exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law claim of uniformity. (R3 l 89-R3190) The Tenth Circuit
was completely silent as to the language of Article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution:

Within the complaint there are only 14 paragraphs citing to the Utah Constitution.
(R3079, 162; R3082, 178; 3135, 1363; R3137, 1373; R3143, 1407; R3144, 1417; R3151, 1459;
R3158, 11494, 496, and 497; R3159, 1500; R3 l 66, 1543; and R3172, 1574) Those allegations
pertain to showing falsity of statements, distinguishing issues not litigated; change in material
operative facts; clearly established law pertinent to immunity; and legal claim of entitlement
arising under State law. (Case 2: l 2-cv-00997-TS, Doc. 38, pp. 9, 11, 16; Doc. 39, pp. 9-11, 18;
Doc. 40, pp. 7, 10, 13, 21, 23-24, 27, 57) (Case 2:12-cv-00997-TS, Doc. 38, pp. 9, 11, 16, 2425, 46, 61-62; Doc. 39, pp. 9-11, 18, 46, 48-49, 50-51; Doc. 40, pp. 7, I 0, 13, 21, 23-24, 27, 46,
52, 55, 57-59) As acknowledged to the trial court, Haik admits these State constitutional
allegations were made. The fact State constitutional principles are alleged relating to immunity
and the like does not equate to adjudication.
14
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"'Indeed, when a court is confronted with a state constitutional claim, the starting point is
the language of the state constitution." Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17.
Silence does not suffice: 'This Court has, in fact, developed a standard for
reviewing legislative classifications under article I, section 24, which is at least as
exacting and, in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard applied under the
federal constitution." Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884,
889 (Utah 1988). Utah Constitution Article XI, § 6, establishes a classification by which
"different treatment being given persons who are, in fact, similarly situated" to "the
detriment of some of those so classified" should be measured. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888 (Utahl 988).
Haik's counterclaims allege: "The City asserts water sales to Lots 9, 13, and 21 of
Albion Basin Subdivision were authorized by change application a16846 (57-10015)."
(R2764 if50) "As of the date of the City's letter, the City's water sales records disclose
water charges for Lots 9, 13, and 21 of Albion Basin Subdivision # I without metering
and without regard to any contract limitation as was asserted in the letter to the Town of
Alta and the Salt Lake Valley Health Department."

(R2766 if63) "The City takes

inconsistent positions regarding contract: on one hand the City asserts only 50 gallons per
day are contractually available under a 1963 Agreement, and on the other asserts: 'The
only thing that has changed since 1997 is that the 1963 Agreement has been abandoned.'
(R2765 ,53) The City admits "application al 6846 allows the City to use more than the
amount of water described in the 1963 Agreement in Albion Basin". (R2765 ,54)
15
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Yet, the City sent a letter to the Town of Alta and the Salt Lake Valley Health
Department asserting "The amount of water allowed under the contract cannot exceed 50
gallons per day per connection."

(R2765 1155-56) The counterclaim alleges:

"Counterclaim Plaintiffs contend the different treatment given them as opposed to other
inhabitants within the City's municipal service area though residing outside the municipal
corporate boundaries in receiving approvals or supply are not based upon differences that
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of Article XI, § 6 and are so
discriminatory as to violate uniformity required by Article I, Section 24." (R2769 177)
One lot is supplied water under Water Right No. 57-10015 (a16846) while the lot across
the street in the same subdivision is subjected to an abandoned contract limit. That is
stark, disparate treatment which denies an express State constitutional right.
Classifying one lot as water worthy under a municipal water right approved to
serve a subdivision but denying water to another lot in that subdivision under pretense of
an abandoned contract limit not applied to the water worthy lot raises question: "We must
also look closely at how the tests have actually been applied." Mountain Fuel Supply Co.
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 889 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1988).

16
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"When determining the constitutionality of a statute under the uniform operation
of laws provision, we ask (1) what classifications the statute creates; (2) 'whether
different classes . . . are treated disparately'; and (3) if there is disparate treatment
between classes, 'whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the
disparity.' State v. Angilau, 201 I UT 3,

,r

21.

"In deciding if a classification is

reasonable, we have considered: (I) if there is a greater burden on one class as opposed to
another without a reason; (2) if the statute results in unfair discrimination; (3) if the
statute creates a classification that is arbitrary or unreasonable; or (4) if the statute singles
out similarly situated people or groups without justification." Merrill v. Utah Labor
Comm'n, 2009 UT 26,

,r

10. The Tenth Circuit used a profoundly different two-step

analysis. (R3 l 89) Given municipal water right is at issue, Article XI, §6, of the Utah
Constitution should trigger a heightened degree of scrutiny.
Recognizing differences in constitutional standards, this Court follows "the
primacy approach, which dictates an analysis of state constitutional law before addressing
any federal constitutional claims." Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17,

,r 46.

The trial

court departed from primacy and erred due to the differing constitutional standards:
"Because the state and federal standards for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to
damages for a constitutional violation are different, a federal court determination that the
material undisputed facts do not give rise to a federal constitutional violation does not
preclude a state court from deciding whether those same facts will give rise to a state
constitutional violation.'' Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ~ 49.
17
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f.

City Violated LUOMA Which Was Never Before Adjudicated

As to the third counterclaim, the City again obfuscates asserting in reference to
due process "Whether Mr. Haik has such a property interest was decided in Haik I and
again in Haik II." (City Br. p. 17) But no due process claims were asserted in Haik I.
(R3 046-R3 06 5)
Rather, in Haik I, Haik alleged "Alta has not formally exercised the power of
eminent domain in taking the Haiks' property, or otherwise compensated the Haiks for
this taking, in violation of Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution." (R3057 141)
Judge Jenkins in denying taking focused upon whether water was "legally 'available"'
"outside Alta's 1976 limits without the consent of the proprietor, Salt Lake City".
(R3231) There was no analysis of whether Article XI, § 6, of the Utah Constitution gave
rise to a "property" right. (R3228-R323 l) On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held only "that
no taking occurred under the Utah Constitution Article I, § 22_;, (R3242) The dicta
"mere expectation of municipal water in the future is not a legal right that constitutes
property subject to taking" is not fair adjudication of whether Article XI, § 6, of the Utah
Constitution gives rise to entitlement constituting property under the purview of due
process protection of the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7.

(R3242)

The

regulation at issue was ''the health department requirement of 400 gallons of water per
day per unit". (R3242)
In Haik II, the Federal District Court asserted "That provision (Article XI, § 6)
states that municipalities are forbidden from leasing, selling, alienating, or disposing their
18
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waterworks, water rights, or sources of water supply, but that such may be used to supply
its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges."

(R3202)(Emphasis added.)

Utah

Constitution Article XI, § 6, actually provides "all such waterworks, water rights and
sources of water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal
corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for supplying its
inhabitants with water at reasonable charges".

(Emphasis added.)

Utah Constitution

Article I, § 26 provides "The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." The Federal
District Court interpreted language different than the plain language of the Utah
Constitution.

(R3202)

The Tenth Circuit then interpreted its prior dicta as an

adjudication and sua sponte raised issue preclusion which the City had not raised on
appeal. (R3 l 87-R3 l 88)
Regardless the unfairness and lack of full opportunity to litigate sua sponte issue
preclusion (an issue not raised by Appellee on appeal), Haik II could not, and did not,
adjudicate how Article XI, § 6, or related appropriation statutes apply to subsequent
claim of injury arising from Haik' s water right. (R2002, iJ24; R20 I 7, if 119)
There is nothing in the prior decisions which adjudicates anything about Haik's
water right. His right is a private water right wholly separate from the City's water rights
subject to Article XI, § 6. A totally new set of material facts arise from the City's new
suit putting at issue its water rights by alleging Haik' s private water right injures or
interferes with the City's water rights.

(R2002, ~24~ R2017, ~119)

The preclusion
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doctrine does not bar adjudication applying Article XI, § 6, to materially new and
independent circumstances of alleged injury and interference arising from Haik's water
right.
By focusing upon the prior decisions rather than the pleadings in this action, the
City fails to address what the third counterclaim actually alleged: "Counterclaim
Plaintiffs seek declaration determining their rights, status, and other legal relations as to
the City arising from or relating to Article I, §7; and whether the expressed intent to deny
water certification for purposes of controlling development in Albion Basin afforded due
process protections as set forth in the provisions of the Municipal Land Use,
Development, and Management Act, Utah Code §§10-9a-101 et seq.; or Utah Code §§
10-3-704-05 or 10-3-711." (R2780 ,127)
The City simply refuses to recognize Haik has his own water right adjudicated by
this Court.

See, Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26 ("We therefore affirm the district

court's entry of summary judgment quieting title to the water right in favor of the Haik
Parties.") Having sued Haik alleging Haik's water right "materially injure Plaintiffs" and
"will interfere with the Plaintiffs' respective rights to divert, treat and provide LCC
water"; Haik is fully entitled to declaration regarding City acts stopping Haik' s use of his
water right.

Whether the City's acts of denying certification as means to "control

development' after Haik acquired the "missing strand" (separately, independently from
entitlement to public water) violate LUDMA is ripe for adjudication. (R2725-R2726,
,,~8-11)
20
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"The expressed intent of denying new water certifications evidenced in the
memoranda of the Director of Public Utilities do not disclose passage or enactment by the
governing body of the City; are not in the mandated form of an ordinance, Utah Code §§
10-3-704-05; and do not include disclosure of publication or posting, Utah Code § 10-3711." (R2773 iJ96) As a result of the City's letter, Salt Lake Valley Health Department
asserts "... failure to attach the required documentation of a letter from the City
indicating his access to water, the sole basis for the summary judgment decision of the
Health Department's hearing Officer" led to denial of approval of sewerage for homes in
the Albion Basin Subdivision." (R2766 ,I64) The City's acts forced Haik into litigation
with the Board of Health as recognized by the City. (City Br. p. 6)
Promising to deny water "as a means of controlling development in the Albion
Basin" violates rights afforded to Haik under the provisions of the Municipal Land Use,
Development, and Management Act, Utah Code §§10-9a-101 et seq.; thereby denying
due process of law protected by Article I, §7, of the Utah Constitution." (R2771 iJ87)
Utah Code § I 0-8-15 does not confer authority upon Salt Lake City to "control
development"; that power is conferred by Utah Code I 0-9a- I 02(2) and does not extend to
the City controlling development in Albion Basin, particularly Albion Basin Subdivision
within the Town of Alta. (R2773 iJ88) Haik's land ownership and water right more than
suffice to sustain declaration as to application of LUOMA. The issues plainly differ.
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g. City's Allegations Put Validity of City's Rights At Issue

As to the fourth counterclaim the City again obfuscates. To be clear, Haik pled
"Counterclaim Plaintiffs seek declaration determining the validity of appropriation by the
City as expressed in Water Right 57-10015 (al6846) or Water Right 57-10013 (a16844)
due to an expressed intent not ( 1) to apply the appropriated water to the stated beneficial
use; and (2) refusal and failure to supply appropriated water within a reasonable time to
the stated beneficial use." (R278 l

iJ 129) Haik further pled "Counterclaim Plaintiffs seek

declaration determining the continued validity of appropriation by the City as expressed
in Water Right 57-10015 (al6846) or Water Right 57-10013 (a16844) due to failure to
apply the appropriated water to the stated beneficial use." (R2781 iJ130)
The City alleged that these rights were "materially" injured and will be
"interfered" with by Haik's water right. By pleading injury and interference to these
water rights, the City opened the door to declaration whether the "injured" or interfered"
rights were validly appropriated or remain valid. Invalid water rights cannot be injured
or interfered with by Haik. Utah Code § 73-3-14 does not bar that declaration given that
the City sued. Haik is not claiming the right to acquire use under appropriative law but
rather whether the City's rights can be a basis for alleged injury or interference. The
fourth counterclaim is not a collateral attack.
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h. City Erroneously Argues Deference

It is precisely the City's claim of material injury to and interference with the City's
water rights which changes the circumstances. Those changed circumstances are what
defeat the City's contentions as to claim and issue preclusion. Having placed material
injury to and interference with the City's water rights at issue; the City opened the door to
declaration.

Pointing back then to prior Federal courts interpretations of the Utah

constitution lacks merit.

Only this Court holds "authority and obligation to interpret

Utah's constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we owe federal
law no more deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical
state language." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 (2007); Gray v. Dep't of Emp't Sec.,
681 P.2d 807 (Utah 1984). All the City is doing is arguing deference, which is a mistake.
Deference is very inappropriate because the Federal courts wrongly departed from
proper State constitutional analysis. As noted above, none of Federal courts began their
interpretation with the language other than that of Article XI, § 6. The Federal District
Court changed the word "shall" to ·'may"; the Tenth Circuit sua sponte interpreted an
Article l, § 22, ruling as adjudication of Article XI, § 6; asserting "Nothing about this
process requires the successful applicant to perfect or to use the water in the manner
approved." (R3 l 88) That statement cannot be reconciled to this Court's precedence.
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This Court's seminal cases are clear: "'the three principal elements to constitute a
valid appropriation of water" are: "(I) intent to apply it to some beneficial use; (2) a
diversion from the natural channel by means of a ditch, canal, or other structure; and (3)
an application of it within a reasonable time to some useful industry." Sowards v.
Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1116 (Utah 1910). Appropriating water imposes a duty to use:
He may not file his application, construct his works, and then hold the
water and wait for something to happen. He cannot withhold the water from
the proposed beneficial use.
Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212,225, 108 P. 1112, 1117 (1910).

"An appropriative

water right depends on beneficial use for its continued validity." In re Bear, 819 P .2d
770, 775 (Utah 1991).
From that direct conflict with this Court's long-standing precedence, the Federal
court then announced an issue of first impression; a narrow, restrictive interpretation of
the word "inhabitant" as used in Article XI, § 6. (R3 I 88-R3189) While acknowledging
Haik's lot lays within the City approved service area, the Federal courts announced that
only persons within the corporate municipal boundaries are entitled to constitutional
protection.

This narrow, restrictive reading appears wholly at odds with this Court's

precedence that "Sec. 6, Art. 11, should not be narrowly or strictly construed." Genola
Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1938). There is real need for this Court
to clarify, uphold, or reject its prior precedence as the conflicts are direct and
irreconcilable. Arguing deference does not help the City.
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III.

CONCLUSION

By ignoring U. R. Civ. App. 24(a), the City did not address its pleading putting at
issue the City's water rights and use; and, thereby properly giving rise to the declaratory
relief pied in the counterclaims such that the decision must be reversed. The entirety of
the City's arguments ignore and defy the proper standard of review.
The trial court was charged to independently analyze State constitutional
guarantees in order to apply preclusion. The trial court failed to do so. The primacy rule
articulated by this Court directed State constitutional analysis because there are clearly
differing tests and more rigorous potential in applying State constitutional guarantees.
Reversal and remand with guidance must follow.
DATED:

November 3, 2016

-;I~e+~d_
PA

R. HAIK

Attorney of Record
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